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Dewey’s pragmatism rejected ‘truth’ as indicative of an underlying reality, instead ascribing 
it to valuable connections between aims and ends. His argument mirrors Bishop Berkeley’s 
Idealism, summarised as ‘esse est percepi’ (to be is to be perceived) (1988/1710, p. 53), 
whose thinking is shown to be highly pragmatist – but who retained a foundationalist 
ontology by naming God as the guarantor of all things. I argue that while this position is 
unsustainable, pragmatism could be strengthened by an ontological foundation. Koopman’s 
charges of foundationalist ‘givenism’ in Dewey’s work, and in his promotion of the scientific 
method, are not proven. However, his ‘genealogical pragmatism’ may develop Deweyan 
educational theory by addressing his dilemmas around curricular study. Koopman’s 
arguments also point towards a missing ontological piece in Dewey’s theory of knowledge. A 
dialogic ontology is offered as compatible with pragmatism: it provides an ethical 
foundation through interrelatedness, and a generative theory of meaning and experience as 
emergent from the encounter with difference. In this framework, to be is to respond – or be 
responded to. This is compatible with Biesta’s notion of ‘coming into presence’ through 
education. The metaphor of ‘realisation’ is offered as capturing the human experience 
implied by this ontological stance. 
 
Introduction 
John Dewey’s Democracy and Education has profoundly shaped my thinking through its 
humane vision of the role of education in society, and the scope and power of its analysis. 
To mark the centenary of its publication I want to explore how Dewey’s radical alternative 
to traditional views of the processes of coming to know, and of education more broadly, 
might be enriched by a return to ontological questions that he studiously avoided. Just as 
pragmatism offered a different sort of epistemology, one without reference to either an 
objective or subjective reality, I would like to offer a different sort of ontology, one without 
metaphysics, which complements and strengthens Deweyan pragmatism – particularly his 
concepts of growth and communication. 
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Seeking to escape the stranglehold of traditional representationalist ontology, in which an 
underlying material reality is the source and guarantor of the truth of our perceptions and 
beliefs, Dewey opts in this book for ontological agnosticism: he puts aside the vexed issue of 
the nature of reality to address the more urgent business of how we come to understand 
and act in the world intelligently and democratically. This remodelling of experience, 
interaction and meaning-making underpins more recent influential educational theories of 
knowledge and democratic participation, notably that of Biesta (2006). Koopman (2009) also 
seeks to build on Dewey in presenting a model of transitionalist pragmatism. He argues that 
Dewey’s writings sometimes lapse into an inadvertent foundationalism that is best 
remedied by hybridising ‘classicopragmatism’, which focuses on experience as the spur to 
meaningful understanding and action, with the linguistic ‘neopragmatism’ of Rorty, Sellars 
and Brandom, which focuses on language instead. This allegation of a flaw in Dewey’s 
theory of inquiry has been strongly contested. (Frega, 2009; Hildebrand & Pappas, 2010; 
Margolis, 2012). Rather than a flaw, then, I have been spurred by Koopman’s critique to 
argue there may be something missing in Dewey’s analysis that shows through at times in 
his writing – which an ontological underpinning can provide. 
In seeking that missing element, I will examine the parallels between Dewey’s pragmatism 
and that of Bishop George Berkeley, an English philosopher writing two centuries previously. 
Despite these parallels, Berkeley maintains a clear ontological stance – that to be is to be 
perceived – and that the existence of all is guaranteed in the omnipercipient mind of God. 
While rejecting this argument, I will suggest that Berkeley was right (or perhaps, prescient) 
to insist on an ontological foundation for his understanding of thought and experience.  
I will then make the case for dialogic theory, as outlined by Wegerif (2008), as a more 
credible and powerful ontological foundation for pragmatism. Its central metaphor of 
‘dialogic space’ implies that meanings emerge from the gaps that open up between 
different perspectives, and thus that difference itself gives rise to meaningful thought and 
action, and offers a source of growth. Further, this theoretical perspective neatly dovetails 
with that of Biesta, whose neo-existentialist notion of “coming into presence” (Biesta, 2001, 
p. 398) operationalises a dialogic ontology both as an ethical imperative and as a framework 
for understanding democratic agency. The key to both, I will argue, is the concept of 
response to difference, sometimes characterised as ‘the Other’. Together, I will argue, they 
can serve as the missing piece in Dewey’s picture. 
Finally, by the way of integrating dialogic ontology with pragmatist epistemology, I will offer 
two metaphors: first, by changing Berkeley’s “to be is to be perceived” to “to be is to 
respond, and be responded to”; second, by suggesting that ‘realisation’, or more properly, 
‘realising’, captures both the ontological basis and the human experience implied by this 
combined theoretical perspective. This theoretical hybrid, shared implicitly or explicitly 
through pedagogy, can deepen people’s motivation to learn with, about and from each 
other, and from the world. 
Bringing these diverse lines of argument together in one article requires regrettable brevity 
in places; in particular, I rely on giving brief synopses of Friedman’s, Koopman’s and 
Wegerif’s arguments rather than the detailed exploration they deserve. I hope that 
responses to my broad claim here will help me to elaborate and strengthen my case in the 
future. 
 
Berkeley’s search for a pragmatist theory of knowledge and action 
Over 300 years ago, Bishop George Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge (1710/1988) provided a powerful critique of realist foundationalism that 
prefigures pragmatism in several important ways – so much so that Charles Peirce said of 
him, “Berkeley on the whole has more right to be considered the introducer of pragmatism 
into philosophy than any other one man” (1903 letter to William James, in Friedman, 2003, 
p. 81). As Friedman points out, Berkeley’s definition of concepts, his understanding of habit 
as the consistent attribution of cause and effect, and his rejection of objects’ metaphysical 
status as unknowable and unhelpful, are all strongly pragmatic. While often labelled an 
empiricist, his enquiries were not underpinned by any experimentation – other than in 
critical thought. Above all, his desire to cut away unnecessary terminology and entities was 
pragmatic in spirit: 
[Berkeley] advises: “Think with the learned and speak with the vulgar” – we may 
make use of any phrases we wish “so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or 
dispositions to act in such as manner as is necessary for our well-being”. (Friedman, 
2003, p. 92) 
The phraseology here – ‘proper sentiments’, ‘dispositions to act’ – and the focus on the use 
of words in initiating actions and valuable outcomes rather than evoking abstract realms of 
existence, is eerily reminiscent of Dewey: Berkeley here is seeking to understand perceiving, 
thinking, feeling and action as interrelated activities that are, in Koopman’s phrase, 
‘melioristic’ (2009, p. 9), or aimed at improvement. Berkeley’s riposte to common attempts 
to describe this process in terms of a connection between ‘perception’ and ‘reality’ is 
somewhat scornful:  
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, 
rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct 
from their being perceived by the understanding. But… what are the fore-mentioned 
objects but the things we perceive by sense? And what do we perceive besides our 
own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any 
combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1710/1988, p. 54)  
This elegant argument for the redundancy of an external material reality also proposes an 
empiricist theory of how we combine changing sensations and ideas to make objects 
meaningful and distinct in our minds. He had explored this more fully in his Essay Towards a 
New Theory of Vision, arguing that since we cannot perceive the distance of an object 
directly, we infer it through a “habitual or customary connexion” (Berkeley, 1709/1948, p. 
17) of relevant ideas. Thus he argues for a collapse of the dualism between mind and world 
so central to Dewey’s highly empirical pragmatism. 
Yet despite these remarkable parallels, Berkeley’s position was explicitly foundationalist. As 
with the contemporary philosophers of optics whose work he sought to challenge, Berkeley 
focused on vision as the basis for his conception of reality. To be is to be perceived – and 
thus the guarantor of the existence of all things not perceived at any given time by ‘spirits’ 
such as you and I must be an omnipercipient God. This position has been much criticised – 
perhaps dismissively, by Samuel Johnson’s kicking of a stone and saying, “I refute it thus!” 
(Patey, 1986, p. 139); perhaps fatally, by arguing that Berkeley’s God is as imperceptible and 
unfalsifiable as the material reality he seeks to undermine. Even Peirce, his strongest 
advocate, expressed his surprise and perplexity on this point: 
“… that he should be capable of falling into so glaring a contradiction with his 
principle… the contradiction consists in his here making the existence of the thing 
consist, not in its being perceived, but in its being capable of being perceived. Now 
the difference between actuality and possibility is surely most important when it is 
existence that is in question.” (Peirce in Friedman, 2003, p.88) 
Yet Peirce’s hypothetical theory of existence – “countenancing the reality of ‘would-be’s’” 
(Friedman, 2003, p. 89) is, I suggest, rather thin and circuitous. The concept of ‘the capacity 
to be perceived’ as the mark of the reality of things may help us to distinguish waking from 
dreaming, the proven from the unproven. Further, suggesting that something might be 
experienced in certain circumstances is useful in relation to Dewey’s notion of thinking, 
which he describes as relating to “the possibility of hypothetical conclusions, of tentative 
results” (1916/1966, p. 149. Italics in original). Yet the idea of granting reality to the possible 
does little justice to the crucially immanent nature of embodied experience, which acts as 
the confirmation or denial of our hypothetical thinking. Importantly, it also does little for us 
in providing a generative ontology, one that could account for how things become capable 
of being experienced. For Berkeley, the vision of God was the sustaining force behind our 
perceptions, but God was also the creative force through which the possibility of 
perception, and of perceivers, comes into being. While his theory cannot stand, I suggest his 
search for a generative, creative ontological force was important. 
Dewey’s ontological agnosticism 
Berkeley’s failure to provide a secure ontological foundation to his pragmatist thinking, and 
Peirce’s unsatisfying attempt at an antifoundational alternative, suggest why Dewey may 
have sought to avoid the attempt entirely. In Democracy and Education, rather than openly 
embracing or rejecting either God or an underlying material reality, Dewey takes an agnostic 
stance by choosing to focus instead on what we can usefully know through a pragmatist 
lens: 
Knowledge, then, is the ability to employ things with a purpose – we have had 
experience with them that enables us to predict how they will react. It is intimate, 
not abstract. (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 185) 
In line with Berkeley’s passion for eliminating redundancy, Dewey seeks to obviate the need 
for abstract ontological speculation by leaving no room for it in an account of our knowing 
through engagement with the world. Koopman, however, has argued that there are leaks in 
the seals of Dewey’s anti-foundationalism that require fixing by hybridising what he calls 
‘classicopragmatism’ with the linguistic ‘neopragmatism’ of scholars such as Rorty and 
Brandom. In this section, I will briefly explore this argument and the counterarguments, and 
subsequently suggest that while Koopman’s case is not proven, it nonetheless helps to 
highlight what I argue is the missing element in Dewey’s thinking. I must stress that these 
arguments are between scholars with a deep knowledge of Dewey and other pragmatists 
that I do not claim the personal authority to rule on; I overview them principally to illustrate 
how these tensions have provoked my own distinctive response – which is to suggest how 
Deweyan pragmatism might be strengthened with an anti-foundationalist ontological 
stance. 
Koopman (2009) recognises that Dewey’s philosophy is essentially, and by explicit intention, 
antifoundational. That said, he then points to a series of examples where he argues that 
Dewey’s use of language, and that of other ‘classicopragmatist’ philosophers, nonetheless 
could be interpreted as implying that experience itself acts a foundation for knowledge. For 
example, he presents a quote from Dewey’s Experience and Nature: 
… primary experience “furnishes the first data of the reflection which constructs the 
secondary objects” such that “test and verification of the latter is secured only by 
return to the things of crude or macroscopic experience.” (Koopman, 2009, pp. 79–
80) 
For Koopman, this is an inadvertent slip into suggesting that ‘primary experience’ is of a 
different order that is presented to us wholesale as a given, rather than retail as mediated 
through our previous experiences, knowledge, understandings and aims – and that it thus 
assumes the prior existence of objects of perceptions or knowledge independent of the 
observer. He then defends Dewey from his own accusations on the grounds that he was 
unable to benefit from the warnings of subsequent philosophers who demonstrated the 
perniciousness of foundationalism in accounts of experience, particularly Sellars’ (1956) 
“myth of the given”. Such warnings, he suggests, would have prompted Dewey to have 
expressed himself more carefully. 
Hildebrand and Pappas’ (2010) response has two main strands. First, they argue that 
Koopman’s picking out of examples from Dewey’s work is partial and unrepresentative, that 
his claim that there are infrequent but consistent ambiguities in Dewey’s expression around 
experience simply doesn’t stand up in the face of the many clear statements of position 
Dewey gave, for example: 
experience is already overlaid and saturated with the products of the reflection of 
past generations and by-gone ages. It is filled with interpretations, classifications, 
due to sophisticated thought, which have become incorporated into what seems to 
be fresh naïve empirical material. (Dewey, 1958, p. 37) 
This quote, they argue, forestalls Koopman’s criticism by anticipating the possible but 
erroneous conclusion that an experience “seems to be fresh naïve empirical material”, when 
in actuality it is already “overlaid and saturated” with prior reflections and interpretations. 
Having made his position so clear, they argue, Dewey should not be presented with this 
charge on the basis of alleged moments of lack of clarity elsewhere. Second, Hildebrand and 
Pappas (2010) argue that Koopman’s attack on experience as foundational, derived from 
Sellars and Rorty, is misdirected; their critique was of the conception of primary experience 
found in Cartesian philosophy – precisely the sort of dualist foundationalism that Dewey 
(and Berkeley before him) were trying to disprove in the first place: 
For the target of Sellars’ critique is a certain conception of knowledge -- experience 
in the modern sense; but this is not ‘experience’ in Dewey's dominant sense, namely, 
the best methodological starting point for a melioristic philosophy in a processual 
world. (Hildebrand and Pappas, 2010, n.p.) 
Dewey’s ‘experience’, they maintain, is foundational only in that he argues that it is where 
we start from, and where we must return, in seeking resolution of our thinking and actions; 
neither of these ideas imply an unmediated essence on which our experiences draw. 
The ultimate aim of Koopman’s critique is to establish the value of his proposed ‘third wave’ 
pragmatism by both drawing on the strengths of, and highlighting the weaknesses of, 
classicopragmatism and neopragmatism. He argues that the linguistic turn of 
neopragmatism gave rise to a new technical vocabulary that would have enabled Dewey to 
clarify his antifoundationalist position: 
[Sellars and Rorty] fashioned a clever way of giving up the quest for the grounds of 
knowledge by favouring instead the project of specifying the field in which 
knowledge operates (Koopman, 2009, p. 95) 
Central to this argument is that our perceptions and experiences are recognised, 
understood and expressed through culturally distinctive linguistic concepts; thus uncovering 
the histories of their development and use is a sufficient description of coming to know and 
understand them, while avoiding any taint of foundationalism (ibid.). Based on their 
defences of Dewey summarised above, Hildebrand and Pappas attack this line of argument 
as “a solution in search of a problem” (2010). They do nonetheless recognise the value of 
Koopman’s attempt to recognise and seek to resolve long-standing tensions between 
pragmatists, and to set out in new directions by bringing in insights from a broader range of 
philosophers. In particular, Koopman intertwines different pragmatic traditions with a wider 
field of philosophers and sociologists such as Foucault and Bourdieu to present what he calls 
“genealogical pragmatism” (2009, p. 10). This combines the power of Foucault’s 
‘problematization’ of the present through a historical study of how ideas and objects came 
to be named, understood and used, with the power of Dewey’s philosophy for 
reconstructing the present to work towards desired futures. In this spirit of pragmatist 
rapprochement, I will start to explore the value of this position below by thinking through 
how a pragmatic genealogical approach might both strengthen Dewey’s central metaphor of 
growth, and add coherence to a pragmatist conception of curricular study. Alongside this, I 
want to suggest that this hybrid position still seeks, like Dewey, to circumscribe Berkeley’s 
ontological ‘quest’ rather than refuting its possibility or necessity. To set up this part of my 
case, I want to turn first to another quotation from Dewey, not highlighted by Koopman, 
which could be interpreted as foundationalist in a different sense. 
Dewey makes clear in Democracy and Education his strong commitment to science as a 
meliorative process of inquiry rather than as a fixed body of knowledge; however, there are 
passages in his later work that appear to contradict this: 
The scientific method is the only authentic means at our command for getting at the 
significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live (Dewey, 1938, 
p.111). 
This implies that there is a unitary scientific method – a contention rejected by historians of 
science since Kuhn (Chalmers, 1982). Also, it claims for that method a monopoly on realising 
‘significance’, thus inadvertently instrumentalising us as tools for the development of 
science rather than vice versa. However, like Koopman, I do not wish to press charges 
because there are mitigating circumstances. Dewey was writing immediately before World 
War II at a time of rising nationalism, bellicosity and irrationality in global politics; as is made 
abundantly clear elsewhere across his work, he saw scientific inquiry as the principle vehicle 
for human progress, and as an intrinsically moral practice aimed at increasing fulfilment at 
the expense of suffering – not as a fixed system discovered by scientists over the ages. A 
lapse into foundationalist language here may have been no more than a form of emotive 
emphasis, in the way I might exhort others to focus on ‘the evidence’ and ‘the facts’ in our 
current climate of ‘post-truth’ politics: my use of those terms would be metaphorical rather 
than ontologically foundational, an appeal to focus on what we can rationally assert and 
discuss rather than divide ourselves through prejudice. Yet I suggest that this lapse was 
indicative of something missing in Dewey’s philosophy, the lack of which was exposed in this 
attempt to reach out to and convince others. My aim is thus to try to complete his 
antifoundationalist jigsaw with an ontological piece. I will introduce this by examining his 
central metaphor of ‘growth’. 
Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there 
is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education. (Dewey, 
1966/1916, p. 51) 
Dewey describes growth as a melioristic process and as an end-in-itself: in persons, in 
education, and in a democratic society. To say that a person, or a society, grows through 
educational activity is in-keeping with this metaphor; it suggests a process of becoming 
more fully human unimpeded by arbitrarily imposed or inherited limitations. Koopman’s 
genealogical pragmatism might help to provide our metaphoric seedling with roots: a 
historical context that it can draw on in responding to the challenges of its present 
environment. From an educational perspective, this may be complementary to Dewey’s 
active notion of responsive, relevant, intelligent enquiry that sits awkwardly with the idea of 
a formal curriculum since, by its nature, it lacks responsiveness to the aims, dispositions and 
needs of individual students: 
Too rarely is the individual teacher so free from the dictation of authoritative 
supervisor, textbook on methods, prescribed course of study, etc., that he can let 
him mind come to close quarters with the pupil’s mind and the subject matter’ 
(Dewey 1966/1916, p. 109) 
Dewey argued that it is the teacher’s role to act as the bridge between students’ interests 
and the accumulated fund of wisdom in a society. I suggest, however, that a genealogical 
conception of formal disciplinary study would support this role by encouraging teachers and 
students together to develop critical understandings of how each discipline came to be, how 
it works, its contemporary uses, its possible future developments, and its syntheses with 
other disciplines – rather than imbibing it as gospel with an emphasis on accurate 
reproduction. It would be about the intelligent engagement with, and use of, disciplinary 
traditions in relation to existing problems in the world, emphasising their social and 
historical context, their development over time, and their transformability in the present 
and future. The study of disciplines would thus become an empowering means to other 
ends-in-view rather than an end in itself, while still respecting their value and integrity as 
repositories of specialised social wisdom. 
If we extend Dewey’s metaphor of ‘growth’ further still, however, we can see its limitations. 
The “indeterminacies” (Burke, 1994, p. 257) we experience – the challenges to our settled 
habits that spur our plants to growth – are like sunlight: when they appear, they stimulate 
and provide the energy for the growing process. But at the risk of overburdening this 
seedling metaphor, it appears to lack one essential element: the soil in which it is rooted. 
And while the parallel process of active inquiry and genealogical inquiry proposed by 
Koopman, entwining two competing pragmatist traditions, is conceptually satisfying and 
educationally productive, it still gives no sense of the source of those enculturated 
responses outside a linguistic analysis of their histories and possibilities on the one hand, 
and the immediacy of our experiences on the other. We should look to go further than 
“specifying the field in which knowledge operates” and responding intelligently to the 
stimulation we receive; we should try to understand why we receive such stimulation, and 
thus seek the sources of these indeterminacies. I suggest that Dewey’s uncharacteristic 
foray into foundationalist language, which implied the prior existence of an underlying 
‘scientific method’, was made due to a lack in his account of any such ontological soil; in 
seeking to communicate the urgent necessity of rational scientific thinking at a critical time 
he lacked something deeper and more resonant to link it to, an ethical imperative with 
inherent rather than instrumental value. In its absence, I suspect Dewey’s exhortation to his 
Kappa Delta Pi society audience that they develop an “intense emotional allegiance to the 
method” (1938, p. 100) left the majority, for whom that sort of affect is reserved for real 
people and humane ideals, feeling cold. Thus Berkeley also had a point in arguing there 
must be an ontological foundation to account for the very possibility of experience as well 
as to understand its operation. Rather than his all-seeing God, however, I propose ‘dialogue 
across difference’ as a generative ontological principle, and as an ethical imperative, for 
melioristic pragmatism. 
 
Dialogic theory: pragmatism’s ontological soil?  
We have seen that pragmatism, a relatively new philosophical tradition developed in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, has roots in the early 18th Century. Similarly, dialogic 
theory was developed principally by the literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin in the late 1910s 
and 1920s, thus making him a direct intellectual contemporary of Dewey. However, 
Bakhtin’s work was only ‘discovered’ in the West in the late 1970s, and subsequently 
interpreted for education and instrumentalised as pedagogy there by, for example, Robin 
Alexander as ‘dialogic teaching’ and by Neil Mercer as ‘exploratory talk’; this has since 
expanded rapidly in popularity as an educational approach (Howe & Abedin, 2013). More 
modestly, it has also been explored philosophically by Wegerif (2007), Kazepides (2010) and 
others. Like pragmatism, the roots of dialogic theory also extend back further – this time to 
Socrates, who wrote: “Thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind 
itself without a spoken sound” (Plato, Sophist, 263e). This demonstrates an insight later 
clarified by Vygotsky as a basis of sociocultural theory: that thought and language are 
learned first through social interaction, and then internalised (Vygotsky, 1978, p.57). Bakhtin 
developed this by arguing that dialogue consists of ‘voices’ – not just of people one talks to, 
but from books and other media, from history and folk culture across what he called ‘Great 
Time’ (Bakhtin, 2010, p. 170). Thus voices come from the outside in, they engage with other 
voices in our minds, and are transformed and re-voiced to others in a continuous chain of 
meaningful dialogue. 
I will try to hybridise pragmatism and dialogic theory in three steps: First, I will argue that 
Wegerif’s conception of ‘dialogic space’ offers a credible dialogic ontology that gives us a 
generative basis for human growth without evoking a metaphysical realm. Second, I will 
show how Bakhtin’s concept of ‘addressivity’ further distinguishes dialogic from realist 
ontologies. Thirdly, I will argue that the centrality of intersubjectivity to the concept of 
dialogic space affords an equally valuable ontological foundation for ethics as well. 
Wegerif defines “dialogic space” as that which “opens up when two or more perspectives 
are held together in tension” (2007, p. 148); although we can never share another’s 
perspective fully, the attempt to cross the gap invites new meanings to emerge from 
between positions. It is thus only inasmuch as we see something differently to others that 
we have any cause to discuss it, and doing so generates a dialogue around that shared 
object or idea. In building his case for a dialogic ontology around this metaphor, Wegerif 
draws on Derrida’s playfully self-referential substitution of “differànce” for “différence” – 
differently spelt, but phonetically identical – to illustrate that the meaning of language is not 
inherent in the identity of words or concepts (ibid., p.22). The substitution of the ‘à’ into 
“différence” changes the meaning of the word, but not through any fixed meaning of the 
letter itself; rather, it is the difference between the ‘à’ and the ‘e’ in the context of the word 
that changes the meaning. It is only because the ‘à’ is in contrast, because it is ‘not-e’, that 
the new word has “an almost infinite but indefinite meaning” (ibid., p.23). The implication is 
that meanings neither have an ultimate origin, nor do they reach a conclusion; they occur 
within chains of dialogue without beginning or end, existing in the dialogic space that opens 
up between different perspectives. Drawing together the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty 
and Bakhtin, Wegerif then advances his ontological argument: that we understand and 
appropriate the world through the adoption of new perspectives on it. Ultimately, this is to 
say that the world (as we know it) comes into being through the act of making meanings – in 
relation not to a physical or metaphysical reality but to ‘original difference’ (ibid., p.26). It is 
immanent, unbounded and generative difference, always already there, as the progenitor of 
dialogic spaces and their emergent meanings. It is not a foundational reality because it is 
never fixed. It is best understood as provoking the linking of prior meanings into new 
meanings rather than inhering in them, as a process not an object. As such, I argue, it 
entirely complements both inquiry-based and genealogical pragmatism as a source for their 
quests for new understandings and responses; it also provides the ontological soil for 
Dewey’s process of growth. 
Another plank of a realist ontology is that ‘truth’ is a function of the accurate and justified 
representation of a statement to an underlying reality. Bakhtin’s dialogic philosophy denied 
any such correlation, arguing instead that within a ‘polyphony’ it is possible for two or more 
contrasting voices to be true; the criterion of truth is thus not the representativeness of 
reality of any one statement, but the ‘addressivity’ of the shared dialogue to the enriching 
goal of engaging with and learning from difference (Robinson, 2011). Again, the parallels 
with Dewey’s pragmatism are clear: inasmuch as it is valuable to talk about ‘truth’ at all, it is 
as the quality of an activity in which exploration of problems leads to personal and collective 
growth. However, Bakhtin’s image of chains of dialogue made of interweaving strands, or 
voices, avoids having to make the outcome of the activity the sole test of its truthfulness, or 
in Dewey’s terminology, its ‘intelligence’. Instead, the process itself is afforded intrinsic 
value through being engaged in the humane response to difference. I say ‘humane’ to 
recognise that, for Bakhtin, a monologue is an interchange in which one seeks to dismiss or 
overrule the value of other voices, thus making for a violent process in which the productive 
exchange of meanings is impeded. Dewey also recognised the inherently educative value of 
genuine communication, and the ethical imperative of this in a democracy (1966/1916, p. 
5); this is relevant to my final step, which is to present a dialogic ontology as an ethical 
foundation. 
In Bakhtin’s work, and its development by Wegerif and others, we see dialogue both as a 
source of meaning and as a form of interrelation, in which we engage with and respond to 
others as if they really matter – whereby meaning itself emerges through the process of 
openly relating, with others at hand or at a distance, to shared ideas. This theme is 
developed by Biesta in his exploration of Levinas, who argues that we are not born thinking 
or knowing, but relating – and that the conscious ‘self’ is a construct that emerges slowly in 
childhood. The baby perceives no identity gap between self and mother until his or her 
perceptions accrue sufficient evidence that different perspectives on the world exist (2006, 
p. 52). So even our identity as perceivers is emergent; each of us is “a-being-with-others” 
(ibid.) whose ontological status is founded in dialogue, or the response to difference. This 
argument also removes the cornerstone of Cartesian foundationalism by making self-
awareness secondary to the experience of relating to others – so we cannot a priori ascribe 
an underlying reality either to the perceiver or the object perceived. Biesta takes this further 
by drawing on Arendt, who argues that our uniqueness makes interaction with other beings 
inherently unpredictable: we are not “endlessly reproducible repetitions of the same 
model” (Arendt 1977, p.9). This means that our human encounters, when responsive to the 
unique person and situation rather than judgemental or instrumental, are also founded in 
difference. Biesta thus calls for education to focus on participants’ “coming into presence” 
(Biesta, 2001, p. 398) through intersubjective engagement. Again, this resonates strongly 
with Dewey’s position in Democracy and Education: “Not only is social life identical with 
communication, but all communication… is educative” (1916/1966, p.5). Furthermore, his 
theory of communication is fully compatible with the concept of dialogic space. He argues 
that one must reformulate one’s ideas in accordance with one’s judgement of another’s 
understanding: “seeing it as another would see it… [so] that he can appreciate its meaning’ 
(ibid., pp. 5-6). New meanings and understandings, then, emerge from the attempt to 
communicate with others; this process is inherently relational, ethical and educative. And 
again, a dialogic ontology particularly complements genealogical pragmatism, which 
emphasises the uniqueness of the situations in which we experience differences because of 
their temporal and cultural contingency. 
 
Bringing these three strands together, I argue that a dialogic ontology is fully compatible 
with pragmatism: it offers a valuable non-metaphysical foundation for pragmatism that 
provides an ever-generative source of meanings and problems, while protecting it from 
lapses into involuntary realism and supporting its central metaphor of growth. It broadens 
pragmatism’s criteria for value or truth to encompass authentic engagement with difference 
in itself, as well as the results of any such engagement. Finally, it roots the ethical nature of 
our interactions in something deeper than our accidental cultural history of meaning-
making and rules: our fundamentally dialogic identities. 
 
Conclusion: some new metaphors for a dialogic pragmatism 
I have argued both for Berkeley’s essential pragmatism, and for his prescience in believing 
there to be a need for an ontological foundation for it. His foundation was “esse est 
percepi”. Yet having debunked the foundational realism of both the perceiver and the 
perceived, how else might this be formulated? My suggestion is ‘esse est respondere et 
respondi’: ‘to be is to respond, and be responded to’. The concept of response to difference 
as an ontological principle focuses on the interrelation between perceiver and perceived, 
and thus makes no metaphysical demands. That which exists does so only as a transitory 
process: a limitless chain of dialogue, the call and response of difference. Once again, this 
idea is hinted at near the start of Democracy and Education, when Dewey asks how ideas, 
unlike objects, can be transmitted: 
…by means of the action of the environment in calling out certain responses. …The 
things with which a man varies are his genuine environment. … In brief, the 
environment consists of those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or 
inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being. (p. 11. Italics in original) 
Dewey here argues that we are defined by how we change – by what we respond to and 
how – and by our distinctive chains of interaction with the environments (including other 
people) which we shape and are shaped by in turn. It is only a small step from here to an 
ontology of difference that breathes generative life into this process. 
Finally, I offer the metaphor of ‘realisation’, or ‘realising’, to encapsulate both the process 
and experience of meaning-making as understood through a dialogic ontology. Its everyday 
double meaning of both making a connection in thought, and of bringing something into 
being, is useful to us here. Firstly, to say that that both meaningful thoughts and actions are 
‘realised’ through responding to difference helps to strengthen Dewey’s argument against 
mind/world dualism by suggesting no material difference between them. Secondly, the 
metaphor of ‘realisation’ seeks to capture something of our experience of agency when we 
respond powerfully to new ideas and situations – the sense that they allow new possibilities 
to come into being that may change us and our environment. Finally, ‘realisation’ seeks to 
capture the ever-emergent, generative nature of our encounter with difference, in contrast 
to the idea of a fixed underlying reality: an immanent, humane and creative principle to 
which I hope Dewey’s student audience, and perhaps the man himself, might have 




I am greatly indebted to David Hildebrand for his generous comments on a prior version. 
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